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Understanding a Complex Phenomenon
ABSTRACT
Bangladesh continues to face a threat from Islamic terrorism. However, the
drivers of this phenomenon remain under-studied. Research has traced ter-
rorism in Bangladesh to wider processes of Islamization; a political context
marked by conflict between the country’s two main political parties and by
authoritarian governance; the institutional weakness of the Bangladeshi
security and justice system; and international factors, such as the Afghanistan
War, influences from the Gulf, and more recently the Rohingya refugee crisis,
as well as the increased interest of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in South
Asia. Based on an analysis of the literature and interviews, I argue that while
the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh has been a complex process in which all
of these factors have interacted, different constellations of them have been
decisive at different historical stages.
KEYWORDS: Bangladesh, terrorism, Islamism, Awami League, Jamaat-e-
Islami
THE DECEMBER 2018 ELECTIONS in Bangladesh, which were marred by
serious irregularities, confirmed in power the Awami League (AL) govern-
ment, which has continuously portrayed itself as a bulwark against Islamic
terrorism. However, the worst terrorist attacks in the country’s history
occurred during the AL’s last tenure (from 2014 to 2018), including the
2016 attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, which was claimed by
the Islamic State (IS). While a harsh security crackdown has prevented open
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terrorist attacks since mid-2017, domestic and international experts concur
that the risk of terrorism persists for various reasons, including problems of
malgovernance and the increased interest that both al-Qaeda and IS have
begun to show in the country (International Crisis Group 2018; Khan 2018,
191–92; Riaz and Parvez 2018, 944–45). Nevertheless, Islamic terrorism in
Bangladesh continues to be under-researched. Thus, many of Bangladesh’s
international partners consider their own understanding of the topic insuffi-
cient for designing effective counter-terrorism support measures.1
Research has traced terrorism in Bangladesh to various factors, including
a wider trend of social and political Islamization (Griffiths and Hasan 2015,
esp. 238; Pattanik 2009) and the rise of Islamic orthodoxy (Kugelman and
Ahmad 2017); a political context marked by fierce conflict between the AL
and its main political rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and by
authoritarian governance (International Crisis Group 2006, 2016; Islam 2016,
25–29; Munir 2015); the institutional weakness of Bangladesh’s security and
justice system (Ganguly and Riaz 2016; International Crisis Group 2016); and
international factors, such as the Afghanistan War, influences from the Gulf,
and more recently the increased influence of al-Qaeda and IS, and the Ro-
hingya refugee crisis (Griffiths and Hasan 2015; Hasan 2012; International
Crisis Group 2018, 13–14; Joehnk 2017; Roul 2014). While research before
2016 often focused on mapping the profiles of Bangladeshi terrorist organiza-
tions (International Crisis Group 2006; South Asia Terrorism Portal 2020),
important new research has investigated the factors driving individual radi-
calization processes (Fair, Hamza, and Heller 2017; Riaz 2016; Riaz and
Parvez 2018).
Although this research has furnished important insights, it leaves several
questions unanswered. Works that trace the growth of Bangladeshi terrorism
to wider Islamization processes often fail to provide detailed evidence that (or
how) a greater presence of Islamic rules in society and politics2 promotes
terrorist activities. Similarly, they often fail to acknowledge the finding of
radicalization research that even an increase in Islamic orthodoxy does not
necessarily translate into terrorism (Harrigan 2013, 62). Furthermore, they
rarely account for the significant ideological differences among the various
1. Interview, UN representative, Dhaka, March 9, 2017.
2. Definition of Islamization adapted from Ismail (2006, 1–4, 22–26).
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Islamic and Islamist groups in Bangladesh.3 Scholarship focusing on the
domestic and international contexts has often questioned the assumption
of a link between religiosity and terrorism, pointing to the political condi-
tions—such as the conflict between the AL and the BNP (Munir 2015),
authoritarian legacies (Milam 2007), or the promotion of local terrorists by
international actors (Roul 2014)—that enable Bangladeshi terrorism. How-
ever, this scholarship has often fallen short of providing a systematic overview
of the specific causal dynamics that could explain how exactly this party
conflict, authoritarian governance, and international factors spur terrorist
activities. Moreover, much research has insufficiently distinguished between
factors that directly promote terrorism and factors that hinder effective
counter-terrorism measures, enabling terrorism indirectly. Furthermore, it
has mostly stopped short of identifying which of the above-mentioned fac-
tors—Islamization, the party conflict, authoritarian governance, institutional
weakness, and various international dynamics—have been the most impor-
tant and how they have interacted in promoting terrorism at different his-
torical stages.
Against this backdrop, in this article I try, first, to provide a more system-
atic overview of the possible causal dynamics explaining how exactly these
factors may promote terrorism; second, to identify the relative importance of
these factors at different points in time; and third, to establish tentative links
between them. I synthesize the existing literature and complement it with
interviews conducted between January 2017 and June 2020. I argue that while
the growth of Bangladeshi terrorism has been a complex process in which
these factors identified by the literature have interacted, different constella-
tions of them have been decisive at different historical stages.
THE PRECURSORS OF TERRORISM DURING MILITARY RULE
In 1971, the Bangladeshi liberation movement, led by the AL, fought a fierce
independence struggle against Pakistan. The Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami
(Islamic Society, JI) stayed loyal to Pakistan, and militias with JI members
3. Islamic groups are understood as social groups adhering to Islam, while Islamist groups are
understood as political actors that locate their demands within an Islamic framework of reference
(Asseburg 2007, 9–11). Islamic terrorism is understood as deadly violence targeting civilians to reach
Islamist goals; definition adapted from Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (n.d., 5).
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massacred Bangladeshi civilians. The independent People’s Republic of Ban-
gladesh was founded as a secular state, with its 1972 constitution enshrining
secularism, nationalism, democracy, and socialism. The AL government of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1971–1975) invoked Bengali nationalism, which
considers Bangladesh’s ethno-linguistic characteristics the basis of national
identity.
State-Led Islamization: The Role of Authoritarian Rule and Influences from
the Gulf
The military governments of General Ziaur Rahman (Zia, 1975–1981) and
General Muhammad Ershad (1981–1990) promoted Islam, to gain extra-
electoral legitimacy. Zia replaced the constitutional principles of secularism
and socialism with the invocation of Allah; his removal of the constitutional
ban on religion-based politics allowed the JI to re-enter the political process.
Zia’s BNP promulgated Bangladeshi nationalism that stressed the Muslim
characteristics of the nation. The Ershad regime made Islam the state religion.
Both military regimes built and renovated mosques and madrassahs (Islamic
education institutions). Socioeconomic decline forced Zia to reorient Ban-
gladesh’s foreign policy toward the oil-rich Gulf states in exchange for aid,
a trend that continued under Ershad (Hasan 2012, 67–68). Consequently,
local mosques and madrassahs increasingly came under the influence of
orthodox interpretations of Islam from the Gulf, such as Wahhabism.
The state-led promotion of Islam empowered Islamic movements that
subsequently made autonomous contributions to Islamic revivalism (Islam
and Islam 2018, 340). For instance, the Tablighi Jamaat (Society for Spread-
ing Faith, TJ), a Deobandi movement, increased its da‘wa (missionary)
activities (Sikand 2001). The Deobandi ideology is a highly orthodox, scho-
lastic doctrine within Sunni Islam that rejects South Asia’s syncretistic Mus-
lim traditions, including the moderate Sufi doctrine. While some Deobandi
groups, such as the Taliban, use violence, others are strictly nonviolent
(Hashmi 2016, 142). The TJ is both nonviolent and apolitical (Sikand
2001). While promoting a textual Islam, it focuses on self-purification,
encouraging Muslims to follow sharia (Islamic law) in their daily lives, and
rejects violent jihad (Huq 2009, 171–72; Islam and Islam 2018, 345–47).
However, it has weakened tolerant, syncretistic Islamic practices (Sikand
2001), such as Sufi Islam.
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Another orthodox religious current that grew from the military period on
is the Ahle Hadith (Followers of Hadith) school, which emphasizes the strict
application of the Koran, sunnah, and hadith,4 rejects the established madh-
habs (schools of Islamic jurisprudence), and strives to cleanse Islam of bid‘a
(innovation). It considers democracy and secularism expressions of kufr:
unbelief (Islam and Islam 2018, 328, 344–45). Thus, Ahle Hadith thought
is the ideological equivalent of Middle Eastern Salafism, which is shared by
al-Qaeda and IS. However, just like the Salafist movement (Wiktorowicz
2006), Bangladesh’s Ahle Hadith community is divided with regard to strat-
egy: there are apolitical quietist, nonviolent political, and jihadist strands
(Ahmad 2006).
There is no clear evidence that the emergence of Islamic orthodoxy during
military rule directly supported the growth of terrorism later on, and in
principle, orthodox groups that provide theological framings for nonviolent
behavior can also contribute to countering terrorism (Lynch 2010). However,
the spread of orthodoxy in Bangladesh seems to have undermined social
tolerance of atheist and other “un-Islamic” beliefs, creating a climate of
impunity for Islamist violence. A local terrorism expert recalled that in
1972 he had stated in a public seminar that “God is disturbing” and that the
idea of God was “bothering” him. While the statement had been hotly
debated, he said, he had been able to make it. During military rule, however,
the dominant discourse had changed in a way that had made it impossible to
criticize the Islamic faith.5 Similarly, Maidul Islam (2016, 27) argues that
Bangladeshi proponents of an orthodox, “scriptural-dogmatic” version of
Islam reject individual liberty in matters of faith and may thus consider acts
of “blasphemy” attacks on Islam that warrant punishment.
Islamic Terrorism: The Role of the Afghanistan War
What contributed more directly to the emergence of terrorism was the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US support for the Afghan resistance
during the Cold War. According to Ali Riaz (2007, 82), around 3,000 Ban-
gladeshis joined a “volunteer corps” to fight alongside the Afghan
4. Sunnah refers to practices, habits, decisions and words of the Prophet Mohammed, while
hadith denotes written records of sunnah (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs
2020).
5. Interview, terrorism expert, Dhaka, March 4, 2017.
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mujahideen. The Ershad regime, which depended on US aid, tolerated the
public recruitment of Bangladeshi fighters (Hasan 2012, 69). According to
a local expert, ordinary citizens often perceived these fighters broadly as
“people going somewhere to fight for Islam and for the cause of Muslims.”
Thus, on their return, they “were [often] regarded as heroes.”6 However, they
“brought back the ideology of jihad,” along with the confidence of having
defeated the Soviet Union, one of the world’s strongest military forces.7
Afghanistan veterans became the leaders of Bangladesh’s major terrorist
groups from the 1990s on (Riaz 2007, 52, 58, 82). In 1992, the Bangladeshi
branch of the Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement), a trans-
national terrorist organization that follows the Deobandi faith, announced its
establishment in a press conference and staged an open procession in Dhaka.
Generally, citizens remained passive, and there were no counter-protests, not
least because the organization was founded by Afghanistan veterans who were
admired by some people.8
TERRORISM DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD, 1991 TO
2008
Between 1991 and 2006, the AL and the BNP alternated in power. The fierce
conflict between the parties periodically manifested itself in violent street
battles, while the party in power regularly harassed the opposition, often
through brutal attacks.
State-Led Islamization: The Role of the Party Conflict
Owing to the party conflict, state-led Islamization continued in the parlia-
mentary period. That is, both the AL and the BNP forged coalitions with the
JI and other Islamist parties to form the government. Consequently, the
influence of the JI in particular grew tremendously.
A lay movement with highly efficient and hierarchical cadre structures
(Mannan 2015, 252), the JI is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in the
Middle East (Kabir 2015, 51). Its ideology is based almost exclusively on that
of Abul A‘la Maududi, who emphasized political work to gain control over
6. Interview, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, Berlin, November 6, 2018.
7. Ibid., and interviews with AL think tank representatives, Dhaka, March 8, 2017.
8. Interview, terrorism expert, Dhaka, March 4, 2017.
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the state as a crucial means for changing society. Thus, the JI officially rejects
violence.9 Nevertheless, it is orthodox in that it opposes Bangladesh’s syn-
cretistic Sufi traditions (Kabir 2015, 52), and its political agenda is undemo-
cratic in that the JI advocates the strict application of sharia, including
corporal punishment for houdoud crimes (violations of Islamic law seen as
crimes against God).10 Moreover, the JI stresses the need to suppress indi-
vidual liberty to establish divine sovereignty, potentially promoting religious
intolerance (Islam 2016, 27).
The BNP’s tenure from 1991 to 1996 saw violent attacks on NGOs,
including the burning of schools run by a development NGO, the Bangla-
desh Rural Advancement Committee (Mannan 2015, 245–77), and a bomb
attack on the home of human rights activist Sultana Kamal (Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada 2003). In 1994, the so-called Sahaba Soldiers called
for the execution of the feminist author Taslima Nasreen, placing a bounty
on her head. Islamist demonstrations against Nasreen in Dhaka demanded
the punishment, and at times the execution, of the writer, along with other
murtaddin, or apostates (Rashiduzzaman 1994, 983). While secular intellec-
tuals and NGOs have often ascribed these attacks on secular actors to the JI,
an investigation by Manzurul Mannan (2015, 277) finds that they were mostly
orchestrated by Deobandi mullahs and madrassahs, with the JI remaining
passive.
From 2001 to 2006, the BNP headed a coalition government that included
the JI and the Islami Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Front), the main political
alliance of the Deobandis. The BNP-led government encouraged the growth
of mosques and madrassahs, and religious practices, such as mosque atten-
dance and veiling, increased (Harrigan 2013, 62).
Islamic Terrorism: The Role of Growing Islamization and Orthodox Islamic
Groups
The tenure of the BNP-led coalition government saw the first major terrorist
attacks, including a grenade attack on an AL rally in 2004, ascribed to the
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh, and over 400 simultaneous bombings
in 2005, claimed by the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (Assembly of
9. Interview, senior JI adviser, Dhaka, March 4, 2017; telephone interview, leading JI member,
February 15, 2017.
10. Interviews, senior JI adviser, Dhaka, March 4, 2017; JI leader, Dhaka, March 6, 2017.
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Mujahideen Bangladesh, JMB). Given that they coincided with the increased
visibility of Islamic practices in the public sphere (Harrigan 2013), many
reports have attributed these attacks to the growing Islamization of society.
More specifically, several works have alleged that the JI sponsored terror-
ism (Ahsan and Banavar 2011, 46–70; Fair, Hamza, and Heller 2017, 4;
Kumar 2009, 545–46). Given that several leading JMB representatives were
former cadres of the JI or its student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)
(International Crisis Group 2006, 18–19), such allegations have some
“descriptive truth.”11 However, the JMB’s main leaders, including its amir
(religious commander) Abdur Rahman and its operational commander Sid-
dique ul-Islam (alias Bangla Bai), adhered to the Ahle Hadith doctrine (Ah-
mad 2006), which differs significantly from the JI’s Maududi ideology. A JI
representative maintained that the possible presence of former JI members in
terrorist groups only showed that “JI is too soft for them . . . too moderate for
them. That’s why they left Jamaat.”12 Several experts likewise said that ter-
rorist violence contradicts the JI’s ideological and strategic approach and that
cadres advocating such violence are either expelled or leave the party volun-
tarily.13 In interviews with a Bangladeshi scholar, JI leaders at the local level
explained that cadres who had left the JI and formed terrorist groups often
“accuse[d] JI of being reformist” and “co-opted” into the corrupt political
system. Conversely, the local JI leaders sometimes viewed the terrorists as
“brave” but “foolhardy,” considering their violent strategy counter-
productive and unlikely to draw popular support.14
The controversy over the JI’s relation to terrorism mirrors the debate,
prominent in Middle East studies, on whether orthodox but nonviolent
mainstream Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood constitute
a “firewall” against terrorism or rather, create a social and ideological envi-
ronment in which terrorism can thrive, thereby acting as a “conveyor belt”
(Lynch 2010). Drawing on Lynch (2016), nonviolent Islamist groups can act
as a “firewall” when the political context allows them to, first, present them-
selves as a viable strategic alternative to terrorist groups, and second, establish
effective organization structures enabling them to rein in militant believers
who might otherwise turn to violence. This excludes neither “crossovers”
11. Interview, scholar, Dhaka, March 9, 2017.
12. Telephone interview, leading JI member, February 27, 2017.
13. Interview, university scholar, Dhaka, March 5, 2017; other interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
14. Interview, scholar, Dhaka, March 9, 2017.
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(Lynch 2010, 470) from such nonviolent Islamist to terrorist groups, nor
individual members of such nonviolent Islamist groups holding ambivalent
views of ideological concepts used by jihadists, such as takfir, declaring fellow
Muslims apostates (474).
Following the 2004–2005 terrorist attacks, another truism was that terror-
ists usually hailed from Qawmi madrassahs, which are often attended by poor
children. However, in Bangladesh, Qawmi has two overlapping but not
identical meanings. The first denotes the country’s numerous privately
funded madrassahs, which exclusively impart orthodox religious teachings
and are not controlled by the state. (This is in contrast to Alia madrassahs,
which are supervised and funded by the state and teach the government
curriculum.) In its second meaning, Qawmi is a synonym for the orthodox
Deobandi faith.15 As of 2007, academic research pointed to a nexus between
terrorism and Ahle Hadith madrassahs (Riaz 2007, 40), from which many
JMB leaders hailed. However, most Ahle Hadith madrassahs are Qawmi
madrassahs in the first but not the second sense; that is, they are unregistered
madrassahs outside state control but do not follow the Deobandi faith.16
Moreover, some Ahle Hadith madrassahs are technically Alia madrassahs
registered with the state (Ahmad 2006). As mentioned, the Ahle Hadith and
the Deobandi ideology have both jihadist and nonviolent strands, pointing to
the need to further investigate the relationship between terrorism and what is
broadly described as Qawmi madrassahs.
The work of Samia Huq (2011a, 2011b) points to the complex effects that
some orthodox groups, such as study circles, may have on their members and
the wider society. While such groups promote textual forms of Islam, they are
very distinct from violent extremist organizations (Huq 2011a, 273, 2011b,
229) and at times reconceptualize jihad as an inner struggle for individual
piety (Huq 2011b, 234, 236–37). Moreover, by consciously maintaining a dis-
tance from Islamist groups like the JI, such groups may sometimes enable
rather than prevent pluralist, secular spaces (Huq 2011a, esp. 269, 282). Con-
currently, however, they may strictly oppose acts of “devian[ce]” from their
own orthodox ideals (Huq and Rashid 2008, 21–22) or induce their members
to maintain a distance from non-Muslims (18), potentially hampering mutual
understanding and thus contributing to intolerance.
15. Interview, embassy expert, Dhaka, March 8, 2017.
16. Interview, NGO expert, Dhaka, March 11, 2017.
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Islamic Terrorism: Secular Problems of a Weak and Corrupt Security
Apparatus
Undoubtedly, however, the 2004–2005 surge in terrorism was enabled by the
weakness and corruption of the security apparatus. The JMB emerged as
a vigilante group in northern Bangladesh, where it was used by local security
officials to fight left-wing insurgents (International Crisis Group 2018, 2–3,
18–19). According to a local expert who accompanied Bangla Bai for one day,
the latter openly exercised de facto control in some areas, giving orders and
commanding JMB forces in the presence of an inactive administration and
police.17 The BNP-led coalition government (2001–2006) initially denied the
JMB’s existence, suggesting that the group enjoyed high-level political pro-
tection (International Crisis Group 2006, 10–11, 18–19). A 2006 counter-
terrorism crackdown conducted mainly by the paramilitary Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB) and the subsequent counter-terrorism measures of both the
military-backed Caretaker Government (2007–2008) and the incumbent AL
government halted open terrorist attacks until 2013.
TERRORISM UNDER THE AL GOVERNMENT FROM 2009 TO THE
PRESENT
Since its election in 2009, the AL has fiercely repressed the opposition. The
BNP boycotted the 2014 elections, while a 2013 High Court verdict barred
the JI from running on the grounds that its charter contradicted Bangladesh’s
secular constitution. The 2018 elections were unfree and unfair, with 288 of
the 300 elected parliamentary seats going to the AL-led alliance.
Islamic Terrorism: Secular–Islamist Contestation, al-Qaeda, IS, and the
Rohingya Conflict
In 2010, the AL government established the International Crimes Tribunal to
bring the war criminals of 1971 to book. Starting in 2013, it sentenced high-
ranking JI leaders to death. But on February 5, 2013, JI leader Quader Mollah
was sentenced to life in prison rather than death, sparking the Shahbag
movement (named after Shahbag Square in Dhaka, where it began), which
was initiated by secular bloggers and demanded death for Mollah, along with
17. Interview, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, Berlin, November 6, 2018.
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a return to entirely secular politics. Hefazat-e-Islam (Protection of Islam), an
orthodox Deobandi network rooted in Qawmi madrassahs, staged large-scale
counter-demonstrations, demanding the punishment of the “anti-Islamic”
and “atheist” Shahbag activists and, at times, the killing of secular bloggers.18
Tracing the origins of Hefazat to the resistance of Deobandi mullahs to
secular NGOs in the 1990s, Manzurul Mannan argued that “these religious
leaders [are] looking for those type of [secular-Islamist] conflicts for two
reasons: conflict helps them popularize their ideology, and through conflict
they’re able to reorganize their organization[s].”19
Tying into Hefazat’s discourse, which approximated the jihadist practice
of takfir, radical local preachers such as Mufti Jasim Uddin Rahmani, a known
sympathizer of al-Qaeda, called for jihadist action. On February 13, 2013, the
secular blogger Rajib Haider was hacked to death by militants of the Ansar-
ullah Bangla Team (ABT), a local terrorist outfit in which Rahmani played
a leading role (Roul 2014, 5) and which styled itself the Bangladeshi Unit of
al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent (Riaz 2016, 2). On May 5, 2013, the AL
government dispersed Hefazat’s protests by force. Between 2013 and 2016,
many secular and atheist bloggers, writers and intellectuals were hacked to
death by violent extremists affiliated with the ABT who claimed allegiance to
either al-Qaeda or IS. Al-Qaeda actively exploited the confrontations
between secularists and Islamists. In January 2014, its leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri called for an intifada and for jihad against the secular AL govern-
ment and other “anti-Islamic forces” (Roul 2014, 5), a move that corresponds
with al-Qaeda’s new global approach of blending into local conflict
situations.
While the AL ultimately cracked down on Hefazat, it was afraid of being
seen as anti-Islamic if it antagonized orthodox groups too much. It was slow
to prosecute the killings of the bloggers, instead reminding secular activists
not to malign the Prophet (Lorch 2019, 269–270, 274). Similarly, the AL
government has been hesitant to protect secular defenders of human rights,
including a very prominent one, whom Hefazat leaders have threatened,
saying, “If you come on the street we’re going to take your flesh and bones
apart.”20 This tendency of the AL government to allow some impunity for
18. Expert, telephone conversation, December 2019.
19. Interview, Manzurul Mannan, Dhaka, March 5, 2017.
20. Interview, prominent human rights defender, Berlin, October 20, 2019.
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Islamist violence appears to be embedded in a wider social reluctance, shared
by growing parts of the population, to be associated with “un-Islamic” or
“anti-Islamic” expressions, a shift encouraged by the growing influence of
orthodox groups. The abovementioned human rights defender told me,
The people . . . they’re religion-fearing, they’re not fundamentalists. But then if
you say something in the name of religion they . . . shrink. You cannot go
against religion. . . . In our culture there is . . . allegiance to religion. But then it
has never been communal . . . , not separating, not dividing . . . [contrary to
today]. . . . People [used to] believe that you should . . . not insult the Prophet
[or say anything against religion]. . . . Now it has become you cannot.21
Analyzing writings by the Islamic Foundation, a semi-autonomous body
under the Ministry of Religious Affairs that conducts research on Islam but
also declaredly promotes the Islamic faith, Samia Huq (2013) finds that over
time the state’s regulation of religion in the name of secularism (13) has
resulted in the state-led promotion of an increasingly textual, rather than
historically contextualized, understanding of Islam that has widened the “gap
between Muslims and the non-Muslim others” (51). While this interpretation
of Islam still demands tolerance of disbelievers, it also invokes notions of the
latter’s culpability (59), potentially promoting intolerance.
In autumn 2015, an Italian missionary and a Japanese aid worker were shot
dead, with IS claiming responsibility. In July 2016, six terrorists besieged the
Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, killing 18 foreigners and four Bangladeshis.
Again, IS claimed responsibility. In March 2017, five suicide bombings
occurred, including an unsuccessful attack on the RAB in Dhaka and a suicide
blast in Sylhet that killed six people, with both al-Qaeda and IS claiming the
attacks (Kugelman and Ahmad 2017). In addition, over two dozen minor
terrorist attempts were committed between 2015 and 2016, but they failed to
draw international attention because they were unsuccessful or not claimed
by a transnational terrorist outfit.22
Some experts suspect that as IS loses its strongholds in Syria and Iraq it
may increasingly turn toward Muslim-majority countries in Asia. Seven
months before the Holey Artisan Bakery attacks, IS launched a Bangla-
language version of its site for the recruitment of followers (Bhattacharya
21. Ibid.
22. Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
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2016). In its mouthpiece Dabiq (named after the town of Dabiq in Syria), it
has called the AL government murtaddin and accused Bangladeshi citizens of
both bid‘a and shirk, or polytheism (Gurski 2017, 85), painting Bangladesh as
a legitimate target for attacks. In April 2016, Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif,
the reputed head of IS operations in Bangladesh, designated the country as
a strategic target owing to its geographical position, which could make it
a springboard for IS to expand into India and Myanmar. A similar strategic
vision had been expressed by al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri in 2014, leading to fears
that the two terrorist outfits might compete for supremacy in Bangladesh
(Stratfor Worldview 2016). While there are few indications of direct opera-
tional connections between Bangladeshi terrorist groups and IS, some Ban-
gladeshi extremists have apparently become attracted to IS’s Salafist ideology.
This aligns with IS’s franchise model of allowing organizationally indepen-
dent terrorist groups worldwide to claim its mantle.23
Since October 2016, atrocities by the Myanmar military have pushed over
800,000 members of the Rohingya, an ethno-linguistic minority that prac-
tices Islam, from Myanmar into Bangladesh. Both al-Qaeda and IS have
exploited the Rohingyas’ misery for propaganda purposes, calling on Mus-
lims in Bangladesh and elsewhere to wage jihad against Myanmar (Site Intel-
ligence 2017a). In 2017, the pro-IS Wafa Media Foundation called for using
the porous Bangladesh–Myanmar border, which has long constituted a hot-
spot for illegal arms and drugs trading, to smuggle arms and fighters into
Myanmar (Site Intelligence 2017b).
Islamic Terrorism: The Role of the Party Conflict and the New Drivers of
Radicalization
The AL considers the JI the main sponsor of terrorism and has fiercely
prosecuted the Islamist party. A representative of an AL think tank, which
provides input into the government’s Countering Violent Extremism pol-
icy, claimed that most of the members of all Bangladeshi terrorist groups,
including the JMB and the ABT, came from the JI. Describing the party’s
ideology as “purely Wahhabi,” he alleged that it had used its membership in
the BNP-led coalition government to “indoctrinat[e] youth for jihad.”24
23. Confidential expert conversation, May 2019.
24. Interview, AL think tank representative, Dhaka, March 8, 2017.
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Both AL sympathizers and leftist secularists tend to view the JI’s support for
terrorism as demonstrated by the 1971 massacres, portraying present-day
terrorism as part of a historical “continuum” ranging from the war of inde-
pendence to the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attacks.25 For the AL, this inter-
pretation aligns with a larger propagandistic initiative aimed at “reinventing
tradition [and] finding a smooth and continuous trajectory” that started with
the Bengali resistance movement and “reached its peak in the current [AL]
government,”26 which the party uses to legitimize its increasingly authoritarian
rule. However, it is important to distinguish between the JI’s historical role and
current terrorist activities.
As in the mid-2000s, former JI cadres might be found in present-day
terrorist groups. After the 2006 crackdown, some remaining factions of the
JMB, which included former JI and ICS members, merged into the ABT
(later renamed Ansar al-Islam, Helpers of Islam). Moreover, some cadres of
the old JMB make up one faction of the “neo-JMB,” a term coined by the AL
government, which holds the group responsible for the 2016 Holey Artisan
Bakery attacks.27 In 2017, the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime
Unit (CTTCU) of the Bangladesh police claimed that former ICS cadres
were leading the neo-JMB (Daily Star 2017). However, there are clear ideo-
logical differences between the JI’s rather pragmatic Maududi ideology and
the revolutionary brand of Ahle Hadith / Salafist thought that terrorist groups
such as the JMB, IS, and al-Qaeda subscribe to. In its online propaganda, IS
has identified the JI as a main target in Bangladesh, alongside the AL and the
BNP,28 a pattern that mirrors the condemnation by both IS and al-Qaeda of
the Society of the Muslim Brothers in the Middle East as traitors who have
forged alliances with apostate, secular regimes (Lynch 2010, 471).
The Holey Artisan Bakery incident further complicated diagnoses regard-
ing the profiles of Bangladeshi terrorists, as the six attackers were mostly from
upper-middle-class families and had educational backgrounds in Western-
ized, English-language private schools and universities (Daily Star 2016),
rather than Qawmi madrassahs. Ali Riaz and Saimum Parvez (2018) find that
many Bangladeshi terrorists are educated young males from well-to-do fam-
ilies who are radicalized through social relationships, personal crises, external
25. Interview, leftist Bangladeshi activist, Berlin, February 2, 2017.
26. Interview, scholar, Dhaka, March 9, 2017.
27. Interview, terrorism expert, Dhaka, March 4, 2017; other interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
28. Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
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relations, and the Internet. A local expert emphasized that present-day ter-
rorists are often self-radicalized and first engage with radical content through
the Internet.29 While the trends of self-radicalization and sudden religiosity
suggest that many new terrorists might be less ideologically versed than earlier
ones, the role of personal crisis indicates that “Islamist” radicalization may
sometimes have strong secular components. Concurrently, the attention of
many international terrorism and aid experts has shifted to English-medium
and private education institutions.30 This new focus, however, neglects the
ongoing radicalizing potential of some madrassahs. For instance, the Holey
Artisan Bakery attackers were “mixed,”31 with at least one being a madrassah
student (Daily Star 2016).
Moreover, individual terrorists may sometimes use nonviolent Islamic
networks, such as the TJ or Sufi networks, to hide or recruit followers.
A member of a Sufi order explained,
[Let’s imagine] I’m a terrorist. . . . Tablighi [Jamaat] . . . they have a huge
network. So after blowing [up] a bomb . . . , I immediately go into Tablighi for
my shelter. . . . [Take] the Kakrail mosque . . . in Dhaka. Every single day 3,000
people enter . . . and just in a few days, they go out [again]. . . . Once you have
killed someone and enter into the Tablighi movement, there is no way anyone
[can] be able to trace you. . . . If you go to our annual [Sufi] festival . . . you will
be shocked how many people go there. . . . Especially the . . . Sufi networks. . . .
Once they [the terrorists] enter into this network, it is next to impossible to
identify them. But then they are using this network to organize.32
In this context, the AL’s targeting of the JI is due to the party conflict as much
as it is to the JI’s problematic legacy, with the AL repressing the JI to weaken
the BNP’s electoral coalition. Drawing on Lynch (2010, 2016), persecution of
the JI may spur terrorism, first because the resulting political vacuum may
increase the “market-share” (Lynch 2010, 482) of jihadist competitors such as
al-Qaeda and IS. Second, the fact that the AL has answered the JI’s nonvi-
olent political engagement with repression may discredit the JI’s nonviolent
approach in the eyes of Islamist activists. Third, the destruction of the JI’s
formerly highly efficient cadre structures may weaken the party’s
29. Interview, terrorism expert, Dhaka, March 12, 2017.
30. Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
31. Interview, UN expert, Dhaka, March 9, 2017.
32. Interview, Sufi order member, Dhaka, March 5, 2017.
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organizational control over more militant members, who might subsequently
join terrorist groups.33
Moreover, to counterbalance the JI’s influence, the AL government has
made significant concessions to the orthodox Hefazat movement.34 For
instance, it has granted official recognition to the dawrah-e-hadith certificates
(from a six-year Islamic studies program focused on Islamic jurisprudence based
on the Koran and the hadith—Miazee 2017) issued by the Deobandi madras-
sahs that form the backbone of Hefazat. Officially, Hefazat leaders have denied
any affiliation with terrorism, calling Islam the religion of peace.35 Similarly,
a Hefazat maulana (master, honorary title for a religious savant) stated that the
Ahle Hadith madrassahs (where many JMB leaders were educated) were mis-
leading people and strongly denied any similarity between Deobandi and Ahle
Hadith madrassahs.36 While there are both violent and nonviolent Deobandi
groups in Bangladesh, from an organizational point of view, Hefazat has sig-
nificantly less potential to act as a “firewall” against terrorism than the JI,
because it is a loose network37 that cannot enforce discipline over its members.
An NGO expert working with the Deobandi madrassahs called them a major
source of hate speech.38 Moreover, the Rohingya crisis may further the radi-
calization of Hefazat, which has staged large-scale protests where it echoed the
rhetoric of IS and al-Qaeda, threating Myanmar with jihad (Joehnk 2017). The
AL government’s co-optation of Hefazat could make the movement’s jihadist
rhetoric and threats against alleged apostates more socially acceptable, enhanc-
ing impunity for terrorist violence. However, just as in the case of the JI, such
co-optation may also make Hefazat the target of terrorist groups such as IS.
Obstacles to Counter-Terrorism: The Role of the Party Conflict and a Weak
Security Apparatus
Both the AL and the BNP have accused each other of terrorism, preventing
the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. In summer 2016,
33. Interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
34. Interviews, Dhaka: AL lawmaker, March 7, 2017; embassy experts, March 8, 2017; other
interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
35. Interview, prominent human rights defender, October 20, 2019; expert, telephone conver-
sation, December 2019.
36. Interview, Hefazat leader, Dhaka, March 11, 2017.
37. Ibid.
38. Interview, NGO expert, Dhaka, March 11, 2017.
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Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina implicated the BNP in the Holey Artisan
Bakery attacks (Fazli 2016). Moreover, many AL leaders accuse the BNP of
having enabled the very emergence of terrorism, both directly during its
tenure from 2001 to 2006 and indirectly through its emphasis of the Islamic
characteristics of the state (International Crisis Group 2018, 18).39
Although some AL representatives appear to be privately convinced of
a growing IS influence in Bangladesh, the AL government has consistently
denied the terrorist outfit’s presence in the country, referring to all terrorists
sympathizing with IS as neo-JMB. A local expert recalled that when he asked
a minister about the government’s reasons for calling the Holey Artisan
Bakery attackers neo-JMB, the minister answered that otherwise they would
have to call them IS.40 Conversely, some BNP leaders accuse the AL of
instrumentalizing, or even inciting, terrorist attacks to get international secu-
rity assistance and/or blame these attacks on the BNP. A high-ranking BNP
leader depicted the post-2013 terrorist attacks as acts of desperate resistance to
the AL’s growing authoritarianism, calling the Holey Artisan Bakery attackers
a loose conglomerate of common people who had been united by govern-
ment repression and maintaining that IS did not exist in Bangladesh.41 In
accusing each other of terrorism, the AL and the BNP thus concur in denying
the possibility of growing IS influence.
Moreover, the term “terrorism” is used broadly in Bangladesh to describe
various kinds of political violence, including state repression and street vio-
lence. Thus, since the 1990s, both parties have continuously designated
violent attacks by their respective rivals as terrorism.42 As a foreign diplomat
summarized, for both parties, the major national threat is not Islamic terror-
ism but the other party.43 A local scholar said that to tackle terrorism “you
have to create a culture of tolerance,” an endeavor in which the political
opposition would also have to participate. “You have to have a general con-
sensus. . . . If you are accusing each other of terrorism, how can you fight it?”44
However, due to the AL’s portrayal of the JI as an extremist group, there is no
39. Interviews, Dhaka: AL functionary at Dhaka University (DU), March 7, 2017; AL lawmaker,
March 7, 2017.
40. Interview, terrorism expert, Dhaka, March 4, 2017.
41. Interview, BNP leader, Dhaka, March 11, 2017.
42. Interviews, embassy experts, Dhaka, March 8, 2017.
43. Telephone interview, European diplomat, February 14, 2017.
44. Interview, DU expert, Dhaka, March 5, 2017.
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interparty dialogue on terrorism. An AL functionary told me that his party
would never dialogue with the BNP as long as it was aligned with the “radical
JI,”45 while an AL lawmaker claimed that the AL government had repeatedly
“invite[d]” the BNP to cut its ties with the JI and then have a dialogue on
terrorism, “but they [the BNP] did not respond.”46
The weakness of the criminal justice system, which is linked to the party
conflict, further diminishes the government’s ability to combat terrorism.
The AL’s instrumentalization of the security apparatus for the repression of
political opponents diverts limited resources from counter-terrorism (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2018, 20–21). Moreover, owing to the AL’s desire to
gain public credit by portraying itself as the main bulwark against terrorism,
state security agencies focus on making and publicizing arrests, rather than on
collecting sufficient evidence for strong judicial cases against terrorism
suspects.47
These problems coincide with an ongoing restructuring of the security
sector. Specifically, the AL government has shifted some responsibility for
counter-terrorism away from the RAB to the CTTCU (International Crisis
Group 2018, 15). And though the government plans to establish local
CTTCU chapters in all districts, so far only the central unit in Dhaka is
operational, and even it is still small and lacks personnel.48 While several
CTTCU officers were drawn from the Detective Branch of the police and
thus had some prior competence in counter-terrorism, many were appointed
due to their political loyalty to the AL rather than their expertise. The chief of
the CTTCU is an AL sympathizer close to Sheikh Hasina,49 heightening the
risk of the unit being instrumentalized for political purposes. The Anti-
Terrorism Unit of the police became fully operational in 2019, but the
division of competencies between this new unit and the CTTU remains
largely unclear.50
Furthermore, the three main agencies in charge of counter-terrorism,
the CTTCU, the RAB and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
45. Interview, AL functionary at DU, Dhaka, March 7, 2017.
46. Interview, AL lawmaker, Dhaka, March 7, 2017.
47. Interview, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, Berlin, November 6, 2018.
48. Telephone conversation, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, June 7, 2020.
49. Interview and telephone conversations, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, Berlin, November 6,
2018, telephone January 31 and June 7, 2020.
50. Telephone conversations, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, January 31 and June 7, 2020.
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(DGFI), the main military intelligence agency, are often competing rather
than cooperating or sharing information. The rivalry appears to be especially
strong between the police-based CTTCU on the one hand and the DGFI
and the paramilitary RAB (both led by military officers) on the other.51
Moreover, under the ever-more-authoritarian AL government the DGFI has
become increasingly involved in politics, including the repression of political
opponents.52
The BNP’s 2014 election boycott left the AL with no proper popular
mandate, a situation that has frightened many party leaders. Moreover,
Western governments have criticized the 2014 and 2018 elections as lacking
credibility. Some experts argue that the main reason the AL government
defines present-day terrorism as purely homegrown is that AL leaders around
Sheikh Hasina have become paranoid that an IS footprint in Bangladesh
might give the West a pretext for forced regime change.53
CONCLUSION
Since the mid-1970s, a number of factors have interacted to enable the rise of
terrorism in Bangladesh: the conflict between the AL and the BNP, author-
itarian governance, certain aspects of the increasing influence of Islamic
orthodoxy, the weakness of the state security apparatus, and various interna-
tional factors—in particular, the Afghanistan War, the transnational influ-
ence of al-Qaeda and IS, and the Rohingya crisis. However, the impact that
different constellations of these factors have had on terrorism has varied
greatly at different historical stages. Moreover, while some factors have
directly promoted terrorist activities, others have hindered the realization
of effective counter-terrorism measures, enabling terrorism indirectly.
During both military rule and the parliamentary period of 1991 to 2006,
the party conflict and authoritarian governance promoted the increasing
Islamization of society and politics, a process that was accompanied by the
growth of orthodox groups. Contrary to what much of the literature implies,
however, there is no clear evidence that Islamization in general or orthodox
Islamic organizations in particular (such as the JI or Qawmi madrassahs) have
51. Interview, Bangladeshi terrorism expert, November 6, 2018.
52. Interviews, Dhaka: Supreme Court lawyer, March 9, 2017; BNP leader, March 11, 2017; other
interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
53. Interview: UN expert, Dhaka, March 9, 2017; other interviews, Dhaka, March 2017.
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directly promoted terrorism. The indirect impacts of orthodox groups on
terrorism have been mixed and highly dependent on their specific tactics and
organizational structures as well as on the specific political circumstances with
which they have interacted at different points in time. Some orthodox
groups, such as the TJ, emphasize individual piety and apolitical engagement
to such an extent that they might in fact provide religious justification for the
separation of politics from religion that liberal secularists also endorse (for
a similar argument see Huq 2009, 176). Conversely, the 2013 agitations of
Hefazat suggest that primarily nonviolent orthodox groups can sometimes
enable terrorism by popularizing takfir narratives that jihadist groups, such as
al-Qaeda and IS, can tie into. Moreover, the reluctance of consecutive gov-
ernments to punish attacks on secular activists whom orthodox organizations
have branded as apostates indicates that the growing influence of Islamic
orthodoxy has contributed to a climate of impunity for Islamist violence.
The secular international power politics of the Cold War contributed
directly to the growth of terrorism. Specifically, the Afghanistan War enabled
the emergence of jihadist leaders who subsequently established terrorist
groups in Bangladesh (Riaz 2007, 52, 58, 82). It also created a certain popular
appeal for the use of violence to defend Islam, even though this appeal was
clearly different from support for terrorism.
Under both the BNP-led four-party government (2001–2006) and the
current AL government (2009–present), the growth of terrorism has been
indirectly enabled by secular problems of a weak and corrupt security appa-
ratus and confrontational party politics. The conflict between the AL and the
BNP has prevented both parties from undertaking an objective analysis of the
causes of terrorism, hindering effective counter-terrorism measures. Under
the present AL government, the ongoing restructuring of the weak security
sector has coincided with the latter’s instrumentalization for the repression of
political opponents. Concurrently, the AL’s repression of the JI as the BNP’s
main coalition partner might promote terrorism, as the weakening of the JI’s
organization structures may diminish the party’s control over more militant
cadres. Moreover, the political vacuum left by the JI might be filled by more-
jihadist competitors.
The AL’s politicized handling of the International Crimes Tribunal has
triggered virulent secular–Islamist contestation, creating discursive and orga-
nizational opportunities for terrorist groups. However, defining the post-2013
growth of Islamist violence as a simple reaction to the AL’s secularization
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policies (Islam and Islam 2018, 352) underestimates the complexity at work.
The post-2013 spike in terrorism appears to have been fostered by a combi-
nation of factors, including an increasing popular reluctance to condemn
Islamist violence against “un-Islamic” individuals, al-Qaeda’s propagandistic
exploitation of the 2013 confrontations, and the radical rhetoric of Hefazat.
New international drivers of terrorism have thus begun to increasingly inter-
act with domestic political dynamics.
Academic and policy research must further investigate the drivers of Ban-
gladeshi terrorism. Thereby, future research should also engage with the
finding of studies on the Middle East that effective organizational structures
may increase the capacity of nonviolent Islamist groups to act as firewalls
against terrorism (Lynch 2010, 2016), while loosely organized Islamist
groups—or Islamist groups whose organizational structures are weakened
by state repression—often lack such ability. Moreover, future inquiry should
further explore the political and organizational circumstances under which
different orthodox Islamic ideologies promote or hinder terrorism. For
instance, the present study suggests that the Ahle Hadith and Deobandi
ideologies may both have complex, and sometimes contradictory, impacts
on terrorism, as they have manifested themselves in both nonviolent (quiet-
ist) and jihadist strands. I see no indications that liberal, syncretistic Muslim
traditions encourage terrorism. Nonviolent orthodox Islamic organizations
may sometimes act as “firewalls” against terrorism, but they can also have
a detrimental impact on democracy (see also Lynch 2010). Thus, all interna-
tional efforts to engage with orthodox groups, such as Qawmi madrassahs,
should be carefully calibrated so as to not undermine Bangladesh’s secular
traditions.
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